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Abstract 
Researchers often conclude an effect is absent when a null-hypothesis significance test yields 
a non-significant p-value. However, it is neither logically nor statistically correct to conclude 
an effect is absent when a hypothesis test is not significant. We present two methods to 
evaluate the presence or absence of effects: Equivalence testing (based on frequentist 
statistics) and Bayes factors (based on Bayesian statistics). In four examples from the 
gerontology literature we illustrate different ways to specify alternative models that can be 
used to reject the presence of a meaningful or predicted effect in hypothesis tests. We provide 
detailed explanations of how to calculate, report, and interpret Bayes factors and equivalence 
tests. We also discuss how to design informative studies that can provide support for a null 
model or for the absence of a meaningful effect. The conceptual differences between Bayes 
factors and equivalence tests are discussed, and we also note when and why they might lead 
to similar or different inferences in practice. It is important that researchers are able to falsify 
predictions or can quantify the support for predicted null-effects. Bayes factors and 
equivalence tests provide useful statistical tools to improve inferences about null effects. 
Keywords: Bayesian statistics, Frequentist statistics, hypothesis testing, TOST, falsification. 
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Researchers are often interested in the presence or the absence of a predicted effect. 
Theories often predict there will differences between groups (e.g., older versus younger 
individuals), or correlations between variables. If such predicted patterns are absent in the 
data, the study fails to support the theoretical prediction. Other times, theories might predict 
the absence of an effect. In both these cases, it is important for researchers to base their 
conclusion that the data they have collected are in line with the absence of an effect on solid 
statistical arguments. 
How can we conclude an effect is absent based on a statistical test of a hypothesis? 
All too often, non-significance (e.g., p > .05, for the conventional alpha level of 5%) is used 
as the basis for a claim that no effect has been observed. Unfortunately, it is not statistically 
or logically correct to conclude the absence of an effect when a non-significant effect has 
been observed (e.g. Dienes, 2016; Altman & Bland, 1995; Rogers, Howard, & Vessey, 1993). 
As an extreme example to illustrate the problem, imagine we ask two young individuals and 
two older individuals how trustworthy they would rate an interaction partner who did not 
reciprocate in a trust game. When we compare the trustworthiness ratings between these two 
groups in a statistical test, the difference turns out to be exactly zero, and there is no reason to 
conclude trustworthiness ratings differ between younger and older individuals. But is it really 
enough data to conclude the absence of an age difference in trustworthiness ratings? And if 
this is not enough data, what would be? 
To conclude the absence of an effect, we need to quantify what 'an effect' would look 
like. It might be tempting to state that anything that is not zero qualifies as an effect, but this 
approach is problematic. First, this definition includes tiny effects (e.g., a correlation of r = 
0.00001) which is practically impossible to distinguish from 0, because doing so would 
require billions of observations. Second, theories should ideally predict effects that fall within 
a specified range. Effects that are too small or too large should not be taken as support for a 
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theoretical prediction. For example, fluid cognitive abilities decline more rapidly in old age 
than crystallized abilities (Ritchie et al., 2016). A decline of 1 standard deviation in reaction 
time differences (which measure fluid cognitive abilities) from age 70 to age 80 in healthy 
adults could be a large, but valid prediction, while the same prediction would be implausibly 
large for verbal ability tasks. Finally, some effects are practically insignificant, or too small 
to be deemed worthwhile. For example, if a proven intervention exists to accelerate the 
rehabilitation process after a hip fracture, a new intervention that requires similar resources 
might only be worthwhile if it leads to a larger effect than the current intervention. 
If we are interested in the absence of an effect, or want to falsify our predictions 
regarding the presence of an effect, it is essential to specify not just what our data would look 
like when the null hypothesis is true, but to also specify what the data would look like when 
the alternative hypothesis is true. By comparing the data against both models, we can draw 
valid conclusions about the presence and the absence of an effect. Researchers should always 
aim to design studies that yield informative information when an effect is present, as well as 
when an effect is absent (see the section on how to justify sample sizes in the discussion). We 
present two methods for evaluating the presence or absence of effects. One approach is based 
on frequentist statistics and known as equivalence testing (Schuirman, 1987), or more 
generally as inference by confidence intervals (Westlake, 1972). Researchers specify 
equivalence bounds (a lower and an upper value that reflect the smallest effect size of interest 
in a two-sided test) and test whether they can reject effects that are deemed large enough to 
be considered meaningful. The second method is based on Bayesian statistics and is known 
as the Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1939). The Bayes factor measures the strength of evidence for 
one model (e.g., the null hypothesis) relative to another model (e.g., the alternative 
hypothesis); it is the amount by which one’s belief in one hypothesis versus another should 
change after having collected data .  
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Bayes factors and equivalence tests give answers to slightly different questions. An 
equivalence test answers the question 'Can I reject the presence of an effect I would consider 
interesting, without being wrong too often in the long run?' A Bayes factor answers the 
question 'given the data I have observed, how much more (or less) likely has the alternative 
model become, compared to the null model?' The choice between frequentist and Bayesian 
statistics is sometimes framed as an ideological decision. Specifically, should one be 
interested in quantifying evidence (Bayesian) or in controlling error rates in the long run 
(frequentist)? Here, we present both approaches as research questions one might want to ask. 
We will focus on how to ask and answer both questions, and discuss when both questions are 
sensible. 
Testing predictions using Bayes factors and equivalence tests 
Most researchers are used to specifying and testing a null model, which describes 
what the data should look like when there is no effect. Both Bayes factors and equivalence 
tests additionally require researchers to specify an alternative model which describes what the 
data should look like when there is an effect. Bayes factors provide a continuous measure of 
relative support for one model over another model. Each model represents the probability of 
effect sizes assuming the hypothesis is correct (before the data have been taken into account), 
and is known as the prior model. After collecting data, a Bayes factor of e.g. 5 suggests that 
the data are 5 times more likely given the alternative hypothesis than given the null 
hypothesis, and a Bayes factor of 0.2 (1/5) suggests the data are five times more likely given 
the null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis. Whether or not this should lead one to 
believe the null hypothesis is now more likely to be true than the alternative hypothesis 
depends on one’s prior belief in either hypothesis. When testing whether people can predict 
the future, a Bayes factor of 5 in favor of the alternative model might increase your belief in 
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precognition somewhat, but you might still think the probability of precognition is extremely 
low (see e.g. Dienes, 2008). Typically, in psychology or gerontology, one can ignore these 
prior probabilities of the theories (which can vary between people), and simply communicate 
the Bayes factor, which represents the evidence provided by the data, and let readers apply 
the Bayes factor to update their individual prior beliefs.  
A common approach when calculating a Bayes factor is to specify the null hypothesis 
as a point (e.g., a difference of exactly zero), while the alternative model is a specification of 
the probability distribution of the effect a theory would predict. Specifying the two models is 
a scientific, not a statistical question, and requires careful thought about the research question 
one is asking (as we illustrate in the examples in this article). A Bayes factor provides a 
continuous measure of how much more likely the data are under the alternative hypothesis 
compared to the null hypothesis. A Bayes factor of 1 means the data are equally likely under 
both models, Bayes factors between 0 and 1 indicate the data are relatively more likely under 
the null hypothesis, and Bayes factors larger than 1 indicate the data are relatively more likely 
under the alternative hypothesis. For a more detailed discussion of Bayes factors, see Dienes 
(2014), Kass and Raftery (1995), or Morey, Romeijn, and Rouder (2016). 
Equivalence tests allow researchers to reject the presence of effects as large or larger 
than a specified size while controlling error rates. To perform an equivalence test, researchers 
first have to determine a 'smallest effect size of interest', the smallest effect they deem 
meaningful. We then use this effect size to set a lower equivalence bound ΔL (in a negative 
direction) and an upper equivalence bound ΔU (in a positive direction). Next, we simply 
perform two one-sided significance tests against each of these equivalence bounds to examine 
whether we can reject the presence of a meaningful effect. This approach reverses the 
question that is asked in a null-hypothesis significance test: Instead of examining whether we 
can reject an effect of zero, an equivalence test examines whether we can reject effects that 
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are as extreme or more extreme than our smallest effect size of interest (in technical terms, 
each bound serves as a null hypothesis in a one-sided test, and a region around zero becomes 
the alternative hypothesis, see Figure 1). If we can reject both equivalence bounds (i.e., the 
first one-sided test shows that the effect in our data is significantly larger than ΔL, and the 
second one-sided test shows that it is significantly smaller than ΔU), then we can conclude 
that the effect is equivalent (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Visualization of null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) for a null-
hypothesis significance test (left), which tests whether the hypothesis that an effect is equal to 
0 can be rejected, and for an equivalence test (right), which tests whether the hypothesis that 
an effect as extreme as or more extreme than ∆L or ∆U can be rejected. 
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In other words, we can reject the hypothesis that the true effect is as extreme as or 
more extreme than our smallest effect size of interest. This approach is known as the 'two 
one-sided tests' approach (TOST), and can be seen as an improved version of the 'power 
approach' (Meyners, 2012) where researchers report which effect size they had high power to 
detect (see Example 4). The TOST approach is equivalent to examining whether a 90% 
confidence interval (for alpha = 0.05) around the effect falls between ΔL and ΔU, and 
concluding equivalence if the 90% confidence interval does not contain either equivalence 
bound (Westlake, 1972, for a related Bayesian procedure, see Kruschke, 2011, 2018). If we 
conclude that the true effect lies between the bounds whenever this procedure produces a 
significant result, we will not be wrong more often than 5%1 of the time. For a more 
extensive introduction to the TOST procedure, see Meyners (2012), Rogers et al. (1993), or 
Lakens (2017). 
Specifying alternative models 
Most researchers are used to testing hypotheses using null-hypothesis significance 
tests where the null model is typically an effect of zero, and the alternative model is 'anything 
else' (see Figure 1). Specifying an alternative hypothesis in more detail might be a challenge 
at first. Both Bayes factors and equivalence tests require researchers to think about the size of 
the effect under the alternative hypothesis. Bayes factors additionally require the specification 
of the shape of the distribution instead of simply specifying the alternative hypothesis as a 
point. Because theories typically allow a range of effect sizes, it is common to specify the 
alternative hypothesis as a distribution of effect sizes, some of which may be more plausible 
1 We use an alpha level of 0.05 in all examples. The confidence interval corresponding to 
one-sided tests is 1 - 2 × α. Thus, for an alpha level of 0.05, a 90% confidence interval is 
used. 
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than others. Because the information gained from performing these tests depends on how the 
alternative hypothesis is specified, the justification for the alternative hypothesis is an 
essential part of calculating and reporting equivalence tests and Bayes factors. In other words, 
the answer we get always depends on the question we ask. It is therefore important to clearly 
specify and justify the question that is asked, whenever reporting statistical tests. 
One possible way to justify the alternative model is to base it on a question related to 
previous studies. For example, a Bayes factor can test whether the new data you have 
collected are more likely if the null hypothesis is true, or if the data are more likely under an 
alternative model specified using the effect observed in an earlier study. An equivalence test 
examines whether we can reject the effect size that was observed in the earlier study, or, as a 
more stringent test, an effect size the earlier study had a statistical power of 33% or 50% to 
detect (Lakens, Scheel, & Isager, 2018; Lenth, 2007; Simonsohn, 2015). Such a test would 
either conclude that the new data support the original claim, or that effect sizes as found in an 
earlier study can be rejected. An additional benefit of Bayes factors and equivalence tests is 
that the results can be inconclusive (e.g., the observed Bayes factor is close to 1, or the null-
hypothesis significance test and the equivalence test are both non-significant), which would 
indicate that the performed study was not sensitive enough to distinguish between the null 
and the alternative model. 
Another possible way to justify the alternative model is to determine a smallest effect 
size of interest. Sometimes a smallest effect size of interest can be specified based on 
objective criteria, such as when the minimal clinically important difference for a measure has 
been determined (Jaeschke, Singer & Guyatt, 1989). Other times, researchers might be able 
to justify the smallest effect size of interest on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Provided 
this cost-benefit analysis is reasonable, rejecting the presence of a meaningful effect, or 
providing strong support for the null hypothesis, would then suggest that an effect is too 
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small to be worth the resources required to reliably study it. Finally, researchers might 
suggest that the sample sizes that are used in a specific research area, or that can be 
reasonably collected, make it interesting to ask if we can reject effect sizes that could be 
studied reliably using such resources. Rejecting the presence of an effect that can be 
examined with the current resources suggests that researchers need to increase the resources 
invested in examining a specific research question. 
Some simple considerations allow convenient ways of specifying the alternative 
model for Bayes factors (see Dienes, 2014). An alternative model indicates the plausibility of 
different effect sizes (e.g., differences between population means) given the theory. What 
effect size is most plausible given past research? A relevant previous study or meta-analysis 
might provide an indication of the effect that can be expected, and an alternative model based 
on a normal distribution centered at the expected effect can be used (see Figure 2). However, 
when building on effect sizes from the published literature, publication bias and 'follow-up 
bias' (Albers & Lakens, 2018) often leads to inflated effect sizes. Therefore, a useful 
assumption in such cases may be that smaller effects are more plausible than larger ones. We 
can represent this assumption about the plausibility of different effect sizes by a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation that sets the rough scale of the 
effect. As the mean of the distribution is zero, smaller effects are more likely than bigger 
ones. If the theory predicts effects in a positive direction, we remove effects below zero, and 
are left with a half-normal distribution (Dickey, 1973; see Figure 2). When modeled as a 
normal distribution the implied plausible maximum effect is approximately twice the 
standard deviation. Often this is a good match to scientific intuitions; and when it is not, this 
feature turns out not to greatly affect results (Dienes, 2017). Dienes (2014) suggests setting 
the standard deviation for a normal (or half-normal) distribution to the predicted effect. Bayes 
factors also depend on the model of the null hypothesis, which can be specified as flexibly as 
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the model of the alternative hypothesis. Here, the null hypothesis is always specified as a 
point-null hypothesis, so we do not further describe it in the examples.  
 
 
Figure 2. Commonly used distributions to model hypotheses for Bayes factors. Top Left. The 
point null hypothesis predicts that 0 is the only plausible value. Top Right. The uniform 
distribution models all values within an interval as equally plausible. Values outside of the 
interval are considered not considered possible. Bottom Left. The half-normal models a 
directional prediction where smaller values are more plausible than larger values. Bottom 
Right. The full normal models the expected value as the most plausible value, with effects in 
either direction considered increasingly less plausible. 
 
In four detailed examples we illustrate different ways to specify alternative models. 
These examples are also used to explain how to calculate, report, and interpret Bayes factors 
and equivalence tests. The specific examples were chosen to demonstrate different ways of 
specifying the alternative model for Bayes factors (e.g., based on past research, the measures 
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used in the study, effect sizes considered interesting by the authors elsewhere in their study) 
and equivalence tests (e.g., based on the smallest effect that a previous study could have 
detected, the smallest clinically relevant effect size, the smallest effect sizes considered 
interesting by the authors elsewhere in their study). The four examples also demonstrate a 
range of conclusions that can be drawn, both for Bayes factors (e.g., evidence for H0, 
evidence for H1, inconclusive evidence) and equivalence tests (e.g., reject meaningful effect 
sizes, fail to reject meaningful effect sizes). Note that our re-analyses are based on the 
statistics reported in each paper and are rounded to one or two digits after the decimal, 
meaning that the values we report may sometimes differ slightly from those that would result 
from analyzing the raw data. We provide reproducible R scripts for all of the examples as 
well as instructions for how to calculate Bayes factors and equivalence tests from summary 
statistics or raw data in online calculators (Dienes, 2008; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & 
Iverson, 2009), simple spreadsheets (Lakens, 2017), the new statistical point-and-click 
software packages JASP (JASP team, 2018) and jamovi (jamovi project, 2018), and in R (R 
core team, 2017) at https://osf.io/67znq/ (all of these software solutions are free, and most are 
open source).  
Following these examples, we also show how to design informative studies that can 
provide support for the absence of a meaningful effect. The conceptual differences between 
Bayes factors and equivalence tests are discussed, but we also note how they often (but not 
always) lead to comparable inferences in practice. 
 
Example 1: Emotion regulation preference in older vs. younger adults. 
Martins, Sheppes, Gross, and Mather (2016) explored the relationship between age 
and emotion regulation by testing participants’ preference for distraction vs. reappraisal while 
viewing images of varying affective intensity. Contrary to their prediction, they did not find a 
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difference in the proportion of trials in which younger (n = 32) rather than older men (n = 32) 
preferred the distraction strategy for negative affective images (Myoung = 0.34, SEyoung = 0.03; 
Molder = 0.32, SEolder = 0.03), t(62) = 0.35, p = .73, d = 0.09. They conclude their discussion 
by stating that they “...found no age differences in regulation preferences in negative 
contexts...”. However, a non-significant t-test is not sufficient to support the conclusion that 
there are no age differences. We can calculate a Bayes factor and perform an equivalence test 
to formally examine whether we can conclude the absence of a difference. 
 
Bayes Factors. To calculate a Bayes factor we must first specify a model of the data 
assuming there is a true effect. We will give two examples, one based on no prior knowledge 
other than the scale that is used, and one model based on results from a previous study by 
Scheibe, Sheppes, and Staudinger (2015). This example will illustrate that using vague 
alternative models, based on the limits of the scale, will allow quite large effect sizes, and 
how an alternative model based on more specific scientific information is typically a more 
interesting question to ask. 
One relatively objective way to specify a model for the data if there is a true effect 
would be to consider the range of possible results based on the scale used in the research. The 
maximum possible effect when calculating proportions is a difference of 1 (i.e., if all of the 
older adults prefer distraction in 100% of the trials, and all younger adults prefer reappraisal 
in 100% of the trials). Of course, this extreme outcome is very unlikely, and if there is a true 
effect, smaller differences should be more plausible. We can model this prior belief about 
smaller differences being more likely than larger differences by using a half-normal 
distribution, with a standard deviation of 0.5. In such a model, the plausibility of differences 
is distributed across a wide range of possible outcomes, but smaller effects are considered 
more plausible than larger effects. 
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Calculating a Bayes factor, based on the observed data that expresses the relative 
support for an alternative model (specified as a half-normal distribution with a standard 
deviation of 0.5) over a point-null hypothesis, yields BH(0, 0.5) = 0.13. Note that subscripts for 
alternative models with half-normal distribution are reported as BH(0, S), where ‘H’ indicates a 
half-normal, centered at 0, with standard deviation of S, while BN(M, S) indicates a normal 
distribution with mean M and standard deviation S, following Dienes, 2014. This means that 
the data are 1/0.13 = 7.69 times more probable under the null model than under the 
alternative model. We conclude that that there is strong evidence for the null hypothesis 
relative to the (rather vague) alternative model of a difference between groups. 
We recommend reporting robustness regions for each Bayes factor that is reported. A 
robustness region specifies the range of expected effect sizes used when specifying the 
alternative model that support the same conclusion (e.g. evidence for H1, evidence for H0, or 
inconclusive outcomes). Robustness regions are reported as Rob. Reg. [L, U], and give the 
lower and upper effect size for the alternative model that leads to the same conclusion, given 
a certain Bayes factor threshold. In this article, we consider Bayes factors larger than 3 as 
support for the alternative, and Bayes factors smaller than ⅓ as support for the null model (cf. 
Jeffreys, 1939). For this Bayes factor, the robustness region is [0.147, ∞]. The fact that the 
upper bound of the robustness region goes to infinity indicates that all effects larger than the 
rough scale of effect used to specify the alternative hypothesis generate the same conclusion.  
We can also specify an alternative model that is based on existing information about 
the effect we are examining - and thus is more relevant to actual inference in the scientific 
context. Martins and colleagues build on a previous study by Scheibe, Sheppes, and 
Staudinger (2015) where the same paradigm was used to examine the difference between 
distraction or reappraisal choices in older and younger participants. Based on this study by 
Scheibe and colleagues, who reported that 40.5% of young adults chose distraction compared 
 15 
to 48.5% of older adults, we have some reason to expect a mean difference of 0.405 – 0.485 = 
-0.08. Note this difference is in the opposite direction to the result obtained by Martins and 
colleagues, who found a mean difference of 0.338 - 0.321 = 0.017. Thus, the mean difference 
is entered as a negative value to reflect the fact the mean difference went in the opposite 
direction to that predicted. We can thus choose an alternative hypothesis with a half-normal 
distribution centered on 0 and a standard deviation of 0.08 (see Figure 3). Now, with this 
more informed hypothesis, we find that the data provided by Martins and colleagues offers 
only weak, inconclusive evidence for the null hypothesis, BH(0, 0.08) = 0.42, Rob. Reg. [0, 
0.189]. If Martins and colleagues wish to obtain strong evidence for either hypothesis, they 
need to collect more data. 
Equivalence test. To perform the equivalence test we must start by specifying the 
smallest effect size of interest. In their previous study, Scheibe and colleagues (2015) did not 
explicitly state which effect size they were interested in. In this case, one way to decide upon 
a smallest effect size of interest is to assume that the authors were only interested in effects 
that could have yielded a significant result, and then look at the effect sizes that could have 
been statistically significant given the sample size they collected. For any specific sample 
size and alpha level, a critical test value can be calculated, and test statistics larger than this 
value will yield significant p-values. Because Scheibe et al. (2015) collected 77 participants 
in total, and used an alpha level of .05, the critical t-value is 1.99. This critical t-value can be 
transformed into a 'critical standardized effect size' of Cohen's d = 0.45. Only effects larger 
than 0.45 (or smaller than -0.45) would have been statistically significant in this study. If we 
assume that sample size in this study was chosen, at least implicitly, based on effect sizes 
deemed interesting by the researchers who designed this study, we can set the smallest effect 
size of interest to an absolute effect size of d = 0.45. It might of course be that the authors did 
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not think about their sample size at all, and would be interested in smaller effect sizes than d 
= 0.45.  
 
Figure 3. The results of Martins et al. (2016), Example 1. The black square indicates the 
observed mean difference of 0.02 (on a raw scale). The data is represented by the likelihood 
distribution (dotted grey line) which is always centered on the observed mean (black square). 
The dark-grey dashed line indicates the half-normal model of the alternative, and the solid 
black line visualizes how that model would be updated in light of the data (the posterior 
distribution). The vertical dashed lines at -0.088 and 0.088 are the equivalence bounds (on a 
raw scale). The 90% confidence interval (the thick black horizontal line) indicates that the 
smallest effect size of interest cannot be rejected (it overlaps with the equivalence bound of -
0.088). The 95% confidence interval (thin horizontal black line) overlaps with zero, which 
indicates the null-hypothesis test can not reject an effect of zero. 
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In other words, our assumption might be wrong, which highlights the important 
responsibility of authors to specify their smallest effect size of interest. As De Groot (1969) 
noted: "Anyone publishing a hypothesis should therefore indicate in particular how crucial 
experiments can be instituted that may lead to the refutation or abandonment of the 
hypothesis."  
Now that the smallest effect size of interest has been determined (based on the study 
by Scheibe et al., 2015), we can proceed by reanalyzing the results from Martins et al, (2016) 
with an equivalence test against equivalence bounds of d = -0.45 and d = 0.45 using the two 
one-sided tests procedure. The first one-sided test indicates that we can reject effects as small 
as or smaller than d = -0.45 (or, in raw scores, a difference of -0.088), t(62) = 2.17, p = 0.017. 
However, the second test shows we cannot reject effects as large or larger than d = 0.45 (in 
raw scores, 0.088), t(62) = -1.47, p = 0.074. Both one-sided tests need to be significant to 
conclude equivalence, so given the observed data and the alpha level we decided on, we 
cannot conclude that the effect is statistically equivalent. It is common to report an 
equivalence test by only providing the one-sided test with the higher p-value (if this test is 
significant, so is the other). So, we would conclude: Based on equivalence bounds of d = -.45 
and d = 0.45, we cannot reject effect sizes that we still consider meaningful, t(62) = -1.47, p = 
0.074. Because the effect was also not statistically different from 0 in a traditional null-
hypothesis test (as reported by Martin and colleagues), the result is inconclusive. We can 
neither conclude that the effect is different from zero, nor that the effect is too small to 
matter. We need to collect more data to draw conclusions about the presence of an effect, or 
the absence of a meaningful effect (or both). 
 
Discussion. Martins and colleagues did not observe a statistically significant 
difference between younger and older men in their choice of distraction as a method for 
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emotion regulation. What can we conclude based on the Bayes factor and equivalence test? 
The equivalence test shows that based on the current data, we cannot reject the presence of 
effects as extreme as d = ±0.45 or more extreme. Whether or not effects of d = ±0.45 are 
interesting should be discussed by researchers in this field. If smaller effects are deemed 
interesting, larger studies need to be performed to draw conclusions. The Bayes factor we 
calculated for an uninformed alternative model suggest that the data provides stronger 
relative support for a null model than for a model that predicts effects up to a difference in 
proportions of 1. However, there is not enough evidence to prefer a null model over a more 
informed alternative model that predicts smaller effects2. That is, based on the best estimate 
of which effect sizes would be reasonable (based on related earlier research), the data are 
non-evidential. We would tentatively answer the question about whether an effect is absent as 
follows: We cannot reject effect sizes that are still deemed interesting (d = 0.45) and there is 
no reason to interpret the data as strong relative evidence for a null model, compared to an 
alternative model informed by previous findings. Thus, it seems prudent to suspend judgment 
about the absence of an effect until more data is available.  
 
Example 2: Comparing self-reported chronic pain in two age groups. 
Shega, Tiedt, Grant, and Dale (2014) studied the relationship between self-reported 
chronic pain and other indicators of decreased quality of life in a sample of 2902 older adults 
(from the National Social Life, Health, and Aging Project). Pain intensity was measured 
                         
2 Taking the ratio of the two Bayes factors in the current example, we see that the data were 
0.42/0.07 = 6 times more probable under the more informed hypothesis than under the less 
informed hypothesis. Bayes factors calculated for different alternative hypotheses can be 
compared in such a way when they have been calculated using the same data and against the 
same model of H0 ( BH1/H0 / BH2/H0 = BH1/H2 ). 
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using a 7-point Likert scale (0 = no pain, 6 = the most pain imaginable). They report non-
significant changes in reported pain across age groups (age 62-69: M = 2.03, SE = 0.084, n = 
1020; age 70-79: M = 1.98, SE = 0.057, n = 1015; age >79: M = 2.14, SE = 0.102, n = 554; p 
= .254). Based on the large sample size, we can assume that the effect size is accurately 
estimated to be close to zero, but to test for the absence of an effect, we need to calculate 
Bayes factors or perform equivalence tests. 
 
Bayes factors. Shega et al. (2014) do not explicitly state that they have a directional 
hypothesis (i.e., they are interested both in whether older adults experience higher or lower 
pain intensity than younger adults). Past research suggests that the experience of pain peaks 
between the age of 50-65 and then plateaus for the remaining years of life (Gibson & Lussier, 
2012). One could therefore model the alternative such that small effects around zero are 
considered most plausible, and with effects in either direction considered increasingly less 
plausible. Thus, an alternative model based on a normal distribution centered on zero would 
be appropriate. 
However, the model of the alternative hypothesis depends on what question we want 
to answer. Researchers have extensively studied the clinical importance of pain ratings (see 
e.g. Dworkin et al., 2008). Reductions in pain of approximately 10-20% were reported by 
Dworkin et al. to be noticeable, and reductions of approximately 40% were judged to be 
meaningful. Twenty percent corresponds to a difference of 1.21 points on a seven point scale. 
If the question is whether clinically important pain differences occur between different age 
groups, we can model the alternative hypothesis as a half-normal with an SD of 1.21. 
Specifying the alternative in this way allows us to ask the question if the observed data 
provide more relative evidence for a model that should be expected when a noticeable 
difference exists than for a null model.  
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For the three comparisons in Shega and colleagues, and assuming the authors were 
interested in effects around the size of noticeable pain differences, we obtain strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis when comparing participants aged 62-69 with participants aged 70-79, 
BH(0, 1.21) = 0.128, Rob. Reg. [0.454, ∞], and with participants older than 79, BH(0, 1.21)= 0.24, 
Rob. Reg. [0.878, ∞]. Here, the evidence in favour of the null hypothesis suggests that the 
data are 1 / 0.128 = 7.81 and 1 / 0.24 = 4.17 times more probable assuming the null 
hypothesis is true than assuming the alternative hypothesis is true, meaning that the Bayes 
factors provide at least some evidence for the null hypothesis relative to the alternative 
hypothesis. In contrast, we find only weak evidence for the null hypothesis when comparing 
participants aged 70-79 with those older than 79, BH(0, 1.21)= 0.37, Rob. Reg. [0, 1.361]. The 
robustness regions indicate that the Bayesian inferences are robust to a broad range of models 
that could be used to specify H1. In the one case where we find weak evidence for the null 
hypothesis, the conclusion would only change if an effect less than the minimal clinically 
relevant effect size was specified for the prior distribution. 
 
Equivalence test. In order to perform the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure we 
need to specify equivalence bounds based on a smallest effect size of interest. When 
examining the minimal clinically important difference, researchers estimate the smallest 
change in pain ratings that leads to a noticeable change on other clinically relevant scales. For 
example, Kelly (2001) reports that the smallest effect size that leads to an individual to report 
feeling “a little better” or “a little worse” is 12 mm (95% CI [9; 12] on a 100-mm visual 
analogue scale of pain intensity (this is very similar to the 10% difference argued as just 
noticeable by Dworkin et al., 2008, cited above). To be conservative, we can use a 9 mm 
difference as the smallest effect size of interest (because smaller differences are not clinically 
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meaningful), which corresponds to a difference of approximately 0.55 points on a 7-point 
scale (used by Shega and colleagues). 
 
Figure 4. The results of Shega et al. (2014), Example 2. The 96.67% confidence 
interval (thick horizontal line, Bonferroni corrected for three comparisons) are within the 
equivalence bounds. The vague alternative model (dashed grey line) spreads the prior 
probability over the full range of the scale. Given the vague prior distribution, and the large 
amount of data, we see the posterior (solid black line) overlaps almost perfectly with the 
likelihood curve (dashed light-grey line) based only on the observed data. Note that in 
Bayesian estimation approaches the entire posterior distribution is used to draw inferences 
(for an introduction, see Kruschke, 2018). 
 
We can now perform equivalence tests for the differences in self-reported pain 
between the three age groups reported by Shega, Tiedt, Grant, and Dale (2014). Because we 
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perform three tests, we will use Bonferroni correction to control the type-I error rate and 
adjust the alpha level to 0.05/3 = .017 for each comparison (for an explanation of corrections 
for multiple comparisons, see Armstrong, 2014). We will begin with the largest difference 
reported for people in the age of 70-79 and those older than 79 (based on the means, sample 
sizes, and standard deviations reported earlier). With an alpha of 0.017 and equivalence 
bounds set to ±0.55 (expressed as a raw mean difference), both one-sided tests (against a 
difference of -0.55 and 0.55, respectively) are significant, t(904.22) = 3.30, p < .001, which 
means we can reject the presence of an effect that is large enough to be clinically meaningful 
(see Figure 4). Note that we report Welch's t-test, as indicated by the fractional degrees of 
freedom, because sample sizes are unequal, and standard deviations can be assumed to be 
unequal as well (see Delacre, Lakens, & Leys, 2017). The same conclusion holds for the 
difference between participants in the age-range of 62-69 and 70-79, t(1791.71) = -4.88, p < 
.001, and for the difference between participants in the age range of 62-69 and older than 79, 
t(1246.34) = 3.30, p < 0.001. 
 
Discussion. Shega and colleagues examined whether there were differences in self-
reported chronic pain across age groups. When we analyze their data with Bayes factors, we 
see consistent support for a null model compared to an alternative model that is specified 
based on ‘clinically important’ differences (as reported by Dworkin et al., 2008). When we 
analyze the data with equivalence tests, we find that we can reject the presence of effect sizes 
large enough to be ‘just noticeable’ (as reported by Kelley, 2001). Thus, we can conclude that 
it seems unlikely that there are substantial differences in self-reported pain across age-groups. 
Where the Bayesian model for the alternative was based on the distribution of effect sizes 
observed in Dworkin et al. (2008), the equivalence bounds were based on work by Kelley 
(2001), establishing a single effect size that represents the minimal clinically relevant 
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difference. The two justifications for the alternative model differ slightly, and illustrate how 
researchers can use different justifications when quantifying their alternative models. 
Justifications for alternative models should be transparent, and are always open for debate. 
 
Example 3: Correlating Big Five openness with Eriksonian Ego integrity.  
Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, and McAdams (2017) studied the relationship between 
concepts of ego integrity and despair from Erikson's theory of personality and the factors of 
the Big Five model of personality traits. They predicted that the Big Five trait 'openness' (as 
measured by the NEO-FFI) should be related to ego integrity (as measured by the 
Northwestern Ego Integrity Scale), and they conclude that this hypothesis is supported by a 
significant positive correlation (r = 0.14, p = .039). They also report a nonsignificant 
correlation between openness and despair (r = 0.12, p = .077). Note the diametrically opposed 
conclusions drawn from these results, although the difference between the two correlations is 
very small (r = 0.14 and r = 0.12). Can the conclusion that there is no relationship between 
openness and despair be statistically justified? 
 
Bayes Factors. The authors’ willingness to interpret r = .14 as evidence for a 
relationship between openness and ego integrity provides an approximate scale of the effect 
size that they would count as evidence for a relationship between openness and despair. Since 
it is preferable to define models in raw effect sizes, we transform these values into raw effects 
by calculating r x SD1/SD2 and obtain b = 0.19 for r = .14 and b = 0.20 for r = .12, 
respectively (SDopenness = 0.6, SDego integrity = 0.8, SDdespair = 1.0). We can model the alternative 
hypothesis for a correlation between openness and despair using a half-normal distribution 
with a standard deviation of b = .19 (r = .14) (see Figure 5). A Bayes factor for the observed 
correlation of b = .20 (r = .12) yields weak support for the alternative hypothesis, BH(0, .19) = 
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2.98, Rob. Reg. [0, 3.024]. We should not be too quick to interpret the nonsignificant result as 
evidence for the null hypothesis. In fact, the data offer weak evidence for an alternative 
model similar to an expected distribution for significant effects that are reported by the 
authors. The appropriate response would be to suspend judgment and recruit more 
participants. 
Figure 5. The results of Westerhof et al. (2015), Example 3. The Bayes factor of 2.98 equals 
the ratio of the density of the prior distribution at zero (dark grey dot) and the posterior 
distribution at zero (black dot), which is known as the Savage–Dickey density ratio method 
(Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010). Because the Bayes factor is 
calculated in raw units (beta), and the equivalence test is performed on the correlation (r), the 
TOST results are not included in Figure 5. 
 25 
Equivalence test. In this case, we know that the authors are willing to treat a 
significant correlation of r = .14 as support for their theoretical prediction, so we might 
assume the authors consider correlations of r = .14 large enough to be meaningful. Note that 
we again draw inferences about researchers’ theoretical predictions based on the results and 
conclusions they report. It would be a great improvement to current research practices if 
authors would explicitly state which effect sizes they consider to be too small to be 
meaningful (and provide a good reason for that judgment). We can perform the two one-sided 
tests procedure for correlations (which relies on Fisher’s z transformation), to formally test 
whether we can reject the presence of an effect as large as or larger than r = .14 for the 
correlation between openness and despair. Not surprisingly given the observed correlation of 
r = .12, we cannot reject the presence of effect sizes as large of larger than r = .14: The 
equivalence test is not significant, z = -0.30, p = 0.38. We cannot conclude the absence of 
meaningful effects if we consider effects of r = 0.14 meaningful. Note that it is possible to 
observe an effect of r = 0.12 and reject effects of r = 0.14, but the required sample size to 
detect such small differences would be extremely large (to achieve 80% power for such a test, 
more than 10,000 observations are required). To reject the presence of small effects, large 
samples are needed, such that the 90% confidence interval around the observed effect 
becomes extremely narrow. 
Discussion. The Bayes factor suggests there is no reason to treat a correlation of r = 
.12 as evidence for the absence of an effect. As the current data provides inconclusive 
evidence for either hypothesis, more data are needed to reach a conclusion. The equivalence 
test shows that we can certainly not reject effect sizes of r = .14, which had been interpreted 
as evidence for the presence of an effect for other correlations. Given that we can neither 
reject the null nor the smallest effect size of interest, the results are inconclusive.  
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Example 4. No Short-Term Differences in Memory After Reward Cues 
Spaniol, Schain, and Bowen (2013) examined whether anticipating a reward would 
enhance long-term memory formation equally well in older and younger individuals. They 
found support for this prediction in two studies. They also tested the hypothesis that an effect 
of reward cues should be absent when a recognition task was presented after only a short 
delay. They concluded in Experiment 2: “Second, neither age group showed an effect of 
reward on memory at the short delay.” There was no statistically significant difference in the 
recognition hit rate in the short delay condition for trials where low reward or high reward 
stimuli were presented for younger participants (n = 32, M = 0.76, SD = 0.17, and M = 0.77, 
SD = 0.14, respectively) or older participants (n = 32, M = 0.75, SD = 0.12, and M = 0.76, SD 
= 0.12, respectively). 
The authors were fully aware that a non-significant result does not allow one to 
conclude the absence of an effect. Therefore, in Experiment 1, Spaniol and colleagues (2013, 
p. 731) write how an interaction effect “failed to reach significance […] even though the 
power to detect a medium-sized interaction was high”. The authors rely on what is known as 
the ‘power approach’ to conclude a meaningful effect was absent. In the power approach, a 
non-significant p-value is used to argue for the absence of an effect that a study had high 
power to detect. For example, if a study had 99% power to detect a medium effect size, and 
no significant test result is observed, researchers using the power approach would feel 
justified in concluding the absence of a medium effect, because a population effect of 
medium size would almost certainly have yielded a significant p-value in the experiment. 
Meyners (2012) explains that this approach, although it was common and even recommended 
by the Food and Drug Administration in the 1980s, should no longer be used. One important 
reason why equivalence tests are preferable is that even practically insignificant differences 
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will be statistically significant in very large samples. When using equivalence tests, 
researchers can instead conclude that such effects are significant and equivalent (i.e., 
statistically different from zero, but also too small to matter). In addition, Bayes factors can 
show that a study with low statistical power for interesting effect sizes provides evidence for 
H0 relative to H1, or that a high-powered non-significant result provides no evidence for H0 
relative to H1 (Dienes & McLatchie, 2018). 
 
Bayes factor. We can compare the difference scores for hit rates in the memory task 
between low- and high-reward trials for older and younger people (i.e., we are examining the 
interaction effect between reward and age). The scale of the effect expected under the 
alternative hypothesis when assessing the impact of high versus low rewards on recognition 
following long and short delays can be inferred from Spaniol et al.’s first experiment. In 
Experiment 1, low-reward or high-reward stimuli were presented for younger participants (M 
= 0.54, SD = 0.18, and M = 0.61, SD = 0.16, respectively) and older participants (M = 0.61, 
SD = 0.15, and M = 0.64, SD = 0.14, respectively). Thus, the obtained difference between 
high and low reward stimuli between younger and older adults in Experiment 1 was: (0.61 - 
0.54) - (0.64 - 0.61) = 0.04. This provides an approximate scale of effect size that is expected 
under the alternative hypothesis fo r Experiment 2. For the short delay conditions, the 
resulting Bayes factor provides only weak evidence for the null hypothesis, BH(0, 0.04) = 0.44, 
Rob. Reg. [0, 0.054]. 
 
Equivalence test. When presenting a non-significant result, the authors discuss the 
statistical power they had to detect a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.50), which 
corresponds to a raw score of 0.039. If we assume that this is the smallest effect size they 
considered interesting, we can set the equivalence bounds to d = ±0.5, or mean differences of 
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-0.039 and 0.039. When we calculate a 90% confidence interval around the mean difference 
for hit rates in the memory task between low and high reward trials for older and younger 
people, it ranges from -0.033 to 0.033, which does not overlap with the equivalence bounds 
(see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. The results of Spaniol et al. (2013), Example 4. The 90% confidence interval (thick 
horizontal line) falls within the equivalence bounds (vertical dashed lines). The prior model 
(dark- grey dashed line) is specified with a half-normal distribution. The model of the data is 
represented by the likelihood distribution (dotted grey line). The posterior distribution (solid 
black line) is the updated estimate of the population effect size based on the prior and 
collected data.  
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We can thus conclude that the difference scores for younger and older participants do 
not themselves differ more than what we consider a 'medium' effect size. The two one-sided 
tests against the equivalence bounds both give t(62) = 1.98, p = 0.026 (the tests are identical 
when symmetrical bounds are used and the observed effect is exactly zero). It should be 
noted that setting equivalence bounds based on the benchmarks proposed by Cohen (1988) is 
not considered best practice in equivalence testing (see Lakens et al., 2018). While in this 
example we have assessed equivalence with respect to what the authors claim to be interested 
in, we recommend that researchers specify equivalence bounds based on theoretical 
predictions or practical importance, where possible, and only use benchmarks as a last resort. 
 
Discussion. The reanalysis of the present results using a Bayes factor and the two 
one-sided tests approach supports the conclusions of Spaniol, Schain, and Bowen (2013). The 
Bayes factor suggests that the data offers only weak, inconclusive evidence for the null 
hypothesis, whereas the equivalence test allows us to reject the presence of effects as large or 
larger than a 'medium' effect. 
 
General discussion 
We have provided several detailed examples to illustrate how researchers in the field 
of gerontology could improve inferences about null effects with Bayes factors and 
equivalence tests. As we mentioned in the beginning, these calculations can be performed 
based on summary statistics using free and easy to use software solutions (see 
https://osf.io/67znq/ for instructions), which in recent years have substantially lowered the 
barriers to making use of the two methods. 
To restrict analytic flexibility and preserve the validity of confirmatory hypothesis 
tests, it is important to specify the alternative model before looking at the data. We 
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recommend that researchers preregister their hypotheses (preregistration can be done 
independently of the publication format of an article; for further resources see 
https://cos.io/prereg/), and we especially recommend the Registered Reports format 
(Chambers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, & Etchells, 2014), where the study design is 
peer-reviewed before the data are collected. It is an excellent way to receive feedback from 
peers about the justification for the alternative model, and whether the question that is asked 
by calculating a Bayes factor or by performing an equivalence test is considered interesting. 
Specifying the alternative model before collecting data for hypothesis tests is also important 
because the sample size required to design an informative study depends, in part, on the 
alternative model. When testing theories, the values used to specify the alternative model for 
a Bayes factor, or the smallest effect size of interest for an equivalence test, should be chosen 
based on reasons internal to the theory, such as effect sizes that are theoretically deemed 
similar. When the smallest effect size of interest is chosen simply on the basis of resources 
(i.e., available funds to pay subjects) the statistical inference does not provide grounds for 
theory testing (for a more detailed discussion, see Lakens et al., 2018). 
 
Justifying sample sizes for equivalence tests and Bayes factors 
Researchers should aim to design studies that yield informative results about the 
presence, and absence, of meaningful effects. It is important that the sample size justification 
for studies reflects both the possibility that the alternative hypothesis is true, and the 
possibility that the null hypothesis is true. When designing studies in which one plans to draw 
inferences based on equivalence tests, one can perform an a-priori power analysis to make 
sure a study has high statistical power to reject the smallest effect size of interest. When using 
Bayes factors, one can design informative studies by using the results from previous research 
to determine the minimum sample size required to obtain sufficient evidence. 
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Bayes factors. For Bayes factors, one could estimate the sample size required to 
provide noteworthy evidence for both the null and the alternative hypothesis, where 
'noteworthy' depends on the Bayes factor you would like to observe (i.e., Bayes factors larger 
than three, six, or ten have been recommended as noteworthy evidence; see Jeffreys, 1939; 
Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2017). The value of such an estimate would be to allow 
researchers to make an informed decision regarding how many participants might be required 
for a given study. However, after the data have been collected, inferences depend only on the 
obtained Bayes factor and not on prior sample size calculations. 
Consider a researcher who aims to determine whether frail older adults demonstrate 
cognitive deficits relative to non-frail older adults. A recent study by Bunce, Batterham, and 
Mackinnon (2018) measured verbal fluency across frail and non-frail adults with an animal 
naming task and reported that non-frail adults recalled significantly more names of animals 
(M = 11.53, SD = 3.52, n = 304) than did frail adults (M = 10.11, SD = 3.20, n = 154), t(456) 
= 4.20, p < .001. The mean difference reported by Bunce and colleagues can be used to 
provide a model of the alternative hypothesis, as the original study provides a rough scale of 
effect. Thus, the alternative hypothesis can be modeled with a half-normal distribution with a 
mode of zero and a standard deviation of 11.53 - 10.42 = 1.42. The standard error reported by 
Bunce and colleagues provides an estimate of the level of noise in the measurement, SE = 
(M1-M2)/t = 0.338. Given that we have a model of the alternative hypothesis, how many 
participants would we need to recruit in order to meet the desired level of evidence if the 
study were to (1) obtain evidence for the alternative (e.g., obtain a mean difference of 1.42) 
or (2) obtain evidence for the null (e.g., obtain a mean difference of 0)? One can calculate a 
series of Bayes factors in which the number of participants is varied from 1 to as many 
participants as the researcher has the resources to recruit. By adjusting the standard error of 
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the data obtained by Bunce and colleagues (which varies as a function of sample size) it is 
possible to calculate the number of participants required to achieve a desired level of 
evidence. Based on the alternative model specified above, one would need to collect a total of 
82 participants to provide noteworthy evidence for the alternative hypothesis (here taken to 
be a Bayes factor larger than 3), and 207 participants to provide noteworthy evidence for the 
null (here taken to be a Bayes factor smaller than 0.33). In practice, one can also test 
sequentially by adding additional data to guarantee sufficient evidence (for a discussion, see 
de Heide & Grunwald, 2018; Dienes, 2016; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2017). 
 
Equivalence tests. For equivalence tests, a researcher can perform a-priori power 
analyses to calculate the number of participants that are required to achieve a desired 
probability of finding an statistically equivalent result, given certain equivalence bounds, the 
alpha level, and the true effect size (e.g. an effect size of 0). This can be done in R, using the 
power analysis functions of the TOSTER package (Lakens, 2017), or in an online calculator 
(http://powerandsamplesize.com/Calculators/). Imagine a researcher who wants to test if a 
reaction time game improves elderly adults’ choice reaction time in a driving simulator. They 
determine that the smallest reaction time difference they would be interested in is the time it 
takes a car to travel 1 meter at a speed of 20 mph (32.1869 km/h), which is 1 𝑚 / 
32186.9 𝑚
3600 𝑠
=
 0.1118 𝑠. Roenker and colleagues (2003) report an average standard deviation of 0.268 
seconds for choice reaction times in a driving simulator task in a sample of 55– to 86-year-
olds (calculated as the mean of the nine standard deviations for Choice RTs in Table 1 in 
Roenker et al., 2003). Based on these data, 0.1118 seconds would correspond to a 
standardized mean difference of d = 
0.1118 𝑠
0.268 𝑠
= 0.42. To be a bit more conservative, the 
researcher decides to set equivalence bounds at d = ±0.4. Assuming a true effect of d = 0, the 
TOSTER power analysis for a two-sample t-test shows that 272 participants (136 per group) 
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would be needed to reject these bounds with 90% power at an alpha level of 5%. Equivalence 
tests to reject effects of a specific size require slightly larger sample sizes than would be 
required to have the same power to to detect these effect sizes in a null hypothesis test 
(Lakens, 2017) and the closer the equivalence bounds are to zero, the larger the sample size 
needed to have high power for the equivalence test.  
 
Should you use Bayes factors or equivalence tests? 
Although Bayes factors and equivalence tests ask slightly different questions, they can 
give converging answers. For example, an equivalence test can show that we can reject the 
presence of a meaningful effect, while the Bayes factor informs us that the data provide 
substantially more evidence for the null model than for the alternative model (see Example 
2). Despite often leading to similar conclusions, these two approaches differ both on a 
philosophical level (e.g., how do we define probability?) and on a practical level (e.g., do we 
want to incorporate prior information in our statistical inferences or not?). There is no reason 
to limit yourself to asking only a single question from your data: one recommendation is 'a B 
for every p'; reporting a Bayes factor alongside every significance test. If the methods lead to 
different answers, this is often informative. It can lead one to reflect on the difference 
between the two approaches, but as long as both tests are used and interpreted correctly, their 
answers should be interesting regardless of whether Bayes factors and p-values agree. 
Evidence and errors are closely related in practice, and Bayesian and frequentist statistics will 
often lead to similar conclusions (Jeffreys, 1939). All else being equal, the larger the Bayes 
factor discriminating the null and alternative model, the lower the error rates in deciding in 
favor of one or the other (for discussion, see Dienes & McLatchie, 2018). 
It is possible to choose one approach over the other. Equivalence tests follow from a 
Neyman-Pearson perspective on statistical inferences, where the main goal is to accept or 
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reject hypotheses without being wrong too often by controlling type-1 and type-2 error rates. 
If a researcher wants to use statistical tests to guide their behavior in the long run, and the 
smallest effect size of interest is theoretically or practically important, then equivalence 
testing would naturally suggest itself as a method. If on the other hand the researcher is 
interested in quantifying relative evidence for two competing models, and the most salient 
aspect of the predicted effect is its rough scale or its maximum, then the Bayes factor would 
be a natural method. If reliable prior information is available, or theories make more specific 
theoretical predictions, Bayesian approaches become increasingly interesting. Remember to 
always ask yourself if hypothesis testing is appropriate, or whether you might simply want to 
estimate the size of an effect instead (for a related approach to the TOST procedure, see the 
ROPE approach by Kruschke, 2011). Note that although we have focused on hypothesis tests 
in this article, reporting and interpreting effect size estimates is important, and should always 
accompany hypothesis tests. 
 
Conclusion 
Embracing methods that allow us to provide support for the absence of a predicted or 
meaningful effect has the potential to greatly improve our statistical inferences. It is logically 
incorrect to conclude the absence of an effect simply on the basis of a non-significant result 
(e.g., p > .05), and we should aim to prevent this common mistake. This will require 
researchers to specify not just what their data would look like when there is no effect, but also 
what their data would look like when there is an effect. Quantifying a smallest effect size of 
interest, or the predictions of a theory, can be a challenge and will require discussions among 
the researchers in a field. But being able to falsify predictions, or corroborate hypotheses that 
predict the absence of an effect, is of utmost importance for scientific progress.  
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